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Abstract
Do domestic institutions affect industrialised countries’ positions in global value chains? A key insight from literature on global
value chains is that a ﬁrm’s decision to offshore depends on the trade-off between price competitive gains and coordination
costs. The role of domestic institutions in this decision has largely been neglected in global value chains analyses. However, a
core insight from literature on varieties of capitalism is that the outcome of this trade-off differs depending on the national
institutions in which ﬁrms are embedded. National economies vary in terms of the importance of non-market institutions for
ﬁrms’ production decisions. This article integrates insights from both literatures, resulting in the hypotheses that for ﬁrms in
coordinated market economies offshoring has lower gains and higher costs than for ﬁrms in liberal market economies and
that this will translate in a different importance and/or geography of global value chains. We empirically test these hypotheses
by focusing on Germany. We ﬁnd that Germany is intensively integrated in international value chains, but that its core sectors
have made relatively more use of ‘near shoring’, as this allows them to retain comparative institutional advantages. This has
permitted Germany to maintain and even expand output and employment in industry.
It is well known that globalisation has transformed the
world economy over the past decades. But globalisation
itself has also changed. Until the 1980s, globalisation
involved the rapid growth of trade in ﬁnal products. Trade
followed the pattern predicted by the logic of comparative
advantage where countries exchanged different types of
products. This changed as the consequence of two trends. A
revolution occurred in business management where ﬁrms
started to focus on their core activities while outsourcing
others. China and other emerging economies opened up
their economies allowing ﬁrms in the industrialised world to
offshore their non-core activities to remote places where
they could proﬁt from much lower labour and other produc-
tion costs. The combination of both trends gave rise to a
new pattern of world trade, no longer primarily charac-
terised by the international exchange of ﬁnished goods but
rather by the exchange of parts, tasks or value added. This
evolution has been captured by the concept of ‘global value
chains’ (GVCs). GVCs became a new reference point in differ-
ent academic disciplines studying international economics
(see Gerefﬁ and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Feenstra and Hanson,
1999; Gerefﬁ, 1999; Gerefﬁ 2014; Baldwin and Lopez-Gonza-
lez, J. (2015), including in international political economy
(IPE; see the introduction to the Special Issue).
Around the same time of the ascendance of GVCs, in the
ﬁnal decade of the 20th century, a new theory was being
developed within comparative political economy (CPE) that
would become seminal within the discipline. The ‘varieties
of capitalism’ (VoC) perspective was the response of com-
parative political economists to the ‘convergence hypothesis’
that stated that globalisation coerces states to adopt similar
political-economic institutions such as deregulated labour
and capital markets in order to attract ‘footloose investors’
(see Hall and Soskice, 2001). VoC scholars opposed this view
and argued that a globalised economy still allows for differ-
ent institutional pathways to economic success. As long as
political-economic institutions are complementary, ﬁrms are
able to be competitive.
Surprisingly, the burgeoning literature on GVCs has paid
little attention to how domestic institutions condition the
response of ﬁrms to incentives offered by the new pat-
terns of international trade and production, thereby
neglecting insights from the VoC literature. This article will
ﬁll this academic hiatus by developing and testing
hypotheses about how domestic institutions affect ﬁrms’
international restructuring decisions. In doing so, the focus
will be on ‘coordinated market economies’ (CME; see
below), and the empirical case that will be analysed is
Germany, the CME par excellence according to the VoC lit-
erature. Today more than ever, Germany is viewed, in
some corners with envy, as a model for how industrialised
countries can retain a high share of employment in man-
ufacturing in the era of global restructuring and deindus-
trialisation in the developed world. We trace to what
extent the effects domestic institutions have on German
ﬁrms’ offshoring decisions can help shed light on this
puzzle.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In
the next section, we brieﬂy introduce the literatures on
GVCs and VoC. Section three integrates their key insights,
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resulting in the hypotheses that domestic institutions have
different effects on the importance and/or geography of
GVCs for different types of developed economies. The next
section tests these hypotheses through an empirical analysis
of Germany. We end with summarising our main conclu-
sions and contributions.
A brief introduction to GVCs and VoC
In the most basic deﬁnition GVCs are value chains – ‘the
process by which technology is combined with material and
labor inputs, and then processed inputs are assembled, mar-
keted and distributed’ (Kogut, 1985, p. 15) – gone global.
This simple deﬁnition illustrates that with GVCs we refer to a
combination of two transformations to business practices.
First, the ‘unbundling of supply chains into ﬁner stages of
production’, (Baldwin, 2013, p. 27), which became prevalent
when companies began to focus on their core activities and
outsource the rest. Second, the ‘geographic unbundling of
stages’ after offshoring production to lower-cost countries
had become more attractive thanks to the ICT revolution,
trade and investment liberalisation and decreasing transport
costs (Baldwin, 2013, p. 27). The expectation in the literature
was that this would lead to an accelerated dispersion of
parts of value chains to different countries (Baldwin, 2013, p.
35). In sum, the rise of GVCs is explained as the combined
effect of lower coordination costs and higher specialisation
gains.
The study of these GVCs has led to the development of
research projects in different disciplines. The main questions
the GVCs literature focuses on are: when and why do ﬁrms
disintegrate their activities in a geographically dispersed
way?; whereto do they offshore?; and how are GVCs gov-
erned? More precisely, GVCs have had the most profound
impact on those academic subﬁelds studying: international
trade and competitiveness indicators (see e.g. Feenstra and
Hanson, 1999; Koopman et al., 2010; Timmer et al., 2015);
the governance of international business relations (Gerefﬁ,
1999; Gerefﬁ and Korzeniewicz, 1994; Gerefﬁ et al., 2005);
and economic development strategies (Baldwin & Lopez-
Gonzalez, J. (2015); Gerefﬁ et al., 2005). The focus in these
projects has been mainly on how to better measure trade
and competitiveness characteristics of countries, on how
ﬁrms in different sectors govern value chains and on how
developing countries can use value chain integration as a
development strategy. As argued in the introduction to this
Special Issue, little attention has gone into how institutions
constitute and are constituted by GVCs. This contribution
will analyse how domestic institutions affect ﬁrms’ decisions
to restructure their activities along GVCs. To arrive at mean-
ingful and testable hypotheses on this causal relationship,
we link the IPE literature on GVCs with the CPE literature on
VoC.
The main motive for the VoC approach was to ‘call into
question the presumption that increasing international eco-
nomic integration will force the institutions and regulatory
regimes of diverse nations into convergence on a common
model’ (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. vi). VoC argues that
national economies can be characterised and differentiated
according to the institutions they provide to allow ﬁrms to
resolve coordination problems (Hall and Soskice, 2001). The
original framework distinguished between two ideal types
of political economies as the poles of a spectrum along
which nations can be classiﬁed: ‘liberal market economies’
(LMEs), where ﬁrms coordinate activities primarily via the
market and ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs), where
coordination happens to a larger extent outside of the
market.
In CMEs, for which Germany was considered the proto-
type, ﬁrms are expected to ﬁnance themselves mainly via
bank credit, engage in consensual relationships with
employees through negotiated agreements with trade
unions, set up vocational training systems to provide their
workers with speciﬁc skills and engage in close networks
with each other to share knowledge and ensure stable sup-
ply chains. In LMEs, for which the United States and United
Kingdom were considered the model examples, ﬁrms fund
themselves mainly through short-term capital, management
has much freedom to hire and ﬁre employees, who gain
skills through formal training outside the ﬁrm, and innova-
tion is distributed between ﬁrms through licensing, mergers
or takeovers. These different institutional conﬁgurations lead
ﬁrms to specialise in different types of activities (Hall and
Soskice, 2001). LMEs specialise in radical innovation, the
invention of new products or major shifts in production pro-
cesses. Firms with radically new ideas can quickly attract
(venture) capital, hire employees with transferable skills and
acquire or sell new technologies. Sectors characterised by
radical innovation include information technology, biotech-
nology or ﬁnance. Firms in CMEs excel in incremental inno-
vation, small and continuous improvements to existing
products and processes. Incremental innovation requires a
skilled workforce that is endowed with sufﬁcient work
autonomy, has product-speciﬁc expertise and is secure
enough to risk suggesting product or process improve-
ments. Sectors characterised by incremental innovation
include machinery and transport equipment.
Hall and Soskice’s original volume has led to a plethora
of studies applying, extending and amending their frame-
work (e.g. De Ville and Vermeiren, 2016; Hall, 2014;
Hancke et al., 2007; Johnston and Regan, 2016; Molina
and Rhodes, 2007; N€olke, 2016; N€olke and Vliegenthart,
2009; Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Especially relevant for
this article is the development of a new type of market
economy called ‘dependent market economy’ (DME), to
account for the institutional conﬁguration emerging in the
former communist countries of the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia. After the implosion of the
Soviet Union, these countries attracted a lot of foreign
direct investment, especially from Western Europe. In com-
bination with institutional legacies from their communist
past and with their integration into the European Union,
this resulted in a speciﬁc type of market economy, where
coordination is not ensured by the market or strong and
cooperative social partners but by (Western) multinational
corporations.
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Varieties of capitalism not only led to many applications
but also received a fair amount of criticism. It has been
portrayed as static and overly functionalist, prioritising the
role of ﬁrms and neglecting the role of governments and
(activist) trade unions, and has been accused of ‘method-
ological nationalism’ by disregarding international processes
(for an overview of these criticisms with references, see
Hancke et al., 2007). The original authors and others have
responded to these criticisms, either by refuting them or
by modifying the original framework, without hollowing it
out (see Hancke et al., 2007 or Hall and Thelen, 2008). We
concur with the latter approach, and try to contribute to
the argument that the VoC framework allows for interna-
tional inﬂuences and can explain change, by integrating it
with a perspective focused on international restructuring
processes.
The next section explains how integrating the key insights
from the GVCs and VoC literature leads to hypotheses about
how domestic institutions affect the importance and/or
geography of GVCs for different types of market economies.
Integrating GVCs and VoC insights
The GVCs and VoC approaches have a number of common-
alities. Both perspectives have seen the daylight in the
1990s as a response to the rapidly changing global econ-
omy of that decade, where traditional trade theories could
insufﬁciently account for. Both start from the micro-level in
studying the international political economy and both take
a relational view of the ﬁrm. They also differ on a number
of points. Although both respond to the transformation of
globalisation in the ﬁnal decades of the 20th century, their
expectations and explanations for this transformation differ.
VoC explains why economic activities cluster, and why they
cluster in a particular country. GVCs, on the other hand,
explains the rise of trade in parts or tasks as the conse-
quence of international de-concentration rather than
national clustering. Most importantly for his article, they dif-
fer in their explanatory variables for ﬁrms’ production deci-
sions.
In GVCs, these are international processes, in VoC domes-
tic institutions. This article argues that both perspectives
should not be considered as necessarily competing, but can
be integrated.
That there was untapped potential for integrating GVCs
and VoC insights had been recognised by Gary Gerefﬁ, one
of the authorities in the GVCs literature: ‘notwithstanding
the potential complementarities between institutional and
organisation perspectives on the global economy, there has
been virtually no dialogue between the two literatures’ (Ger-
efﬁ et al. 2005, p. 170). This dialogue is still absent, with the
notable exceptions of books and articles by Lane and Pro-
bert (2006, 2009) and by Herrigel (2010; with Herrigel and
Wittke, 2005). However, these studies are based on anecdo-
tal ﬁrm-level evidence. In the remainder of this article, we
try to offer a more systematic theoretical integration and
quantitative empirical analysis, using aggregate data on the
state and sector rather than ﬁrm level.
Following from the preceding discussion of the main
insights of GVCs and VoC, we can put forward two hypothe-
ses about how the rise of GVCs interacts with the existence
of VoC. We will thereby focus on coordinated market econo-
mies, because it is here that VoC expects (global) market
forces to be mitigated by domestic institutions, while using
liberal market economies as benchmarks in the background,
where domestic institutions are expected to align with (glo-
bal) market processes.
When combining VoC with GVCs insights, one expectation
is that ﬁrms in CMEs will be less involved in GVCs. This fol-
lows from integrating the key insight from GVCs that the
decision of a ﬁrm to offshore production internationally is
based on a ‘coordination cost – specialisation beneﬁt analy-
sis’ with the key insight from VoC that the comparative insti-
tutional advantage of ﬁrms in CMEs is signiﬁcantly built on
coordinated, non-market relationships:
• First, international fragmentation might be more costly for
ﬁrms in CMEs. Incremental innovation in which CMEs spe-
cialise involves continuous improvement along the value
chain. This means that product development and design
on the one hand and product manufacturing on the other
are less separable than is the case for goods characterised
by radical innovation in which LMEs have a comparative
advantage. Design and product improvement often coin-
cide with the production process. Firms in CMEs gain com-
parative institutional advantage from close coordination
with suppliers and buyers and with workers endowed with
speciﬁc skills through vocational training. Offshoring holds
the risk that ﬁrms in CMEs lose the ability of continuous
improvement throughout the supply chain by abandoning
control over skill-formation of employees or close relation-
ships with supplier ﬁrms. Formulated differently, in con-
trast to ‘switchable assets’ that are central in LMEs, ‘speciﬁc
or co-speciﬁc assets’ prevalent in CMEs are more difﬁcult
to separate and disperse internationally (cfr. Gerefﬁ et al.,
2005). In sum, coordination costs are higher for ﬁrms in
CMEs when offshoring.
• Second, international fragmentation might be less reward-
ing for ﬁrms in CMEs. As CMEs specialise in ‘quality-differ-
entiated production’ (Streeck, 1992) rather than in goods
that compete on price, they are less pressured to engage
in offshoring to remain cost competitive. In other words,
specialisation beneﬁts for them are lower. Hence, differ-
ences in wage levels are less of an incentive for their
ﬁrms to offshore to developing or emerging economies.
• Third, international fragmentation might be more easily
vetoed in ﬁrms in CMEs. As trade unions in CMEs have
greater institutionalised power, they are more able to veto
outsourcing of tasks than weaker trade unions in LMEs.
Firms in LMEs, on the other hand, tend to specialise in
high-technology consumer products that partly involve
unsophisticated, labour-intensive tasks (e.g. mobile phone
assembly). Hence, a clear spatial separation between design
and production is possible. These products compete signiﬁ-
cantly on price. Therefore, in the coordination costs – spe-
cialisation gains trade-off they feel more pressure to
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offshore to stay cost competitive and this comes with lower
coordination costs as tasks are more easily separable. Finally,
trade unions in LMEs lack the power to veto offshoring.
Hypothesis 1: Firms in CMEs will engage less in
GVCs
Domestic institutions can be expected to not just present
ﬁrms with the choice to engage in offshoring or not (and if
so, to what extent), but to also affect the geography of their
offshoring decisions. In the international management litera-
ture, the interplay between coordination and distance is
highlighted (see e.g. Ceci and Prencipe, 2013). Coordination
costs are expected to increase with distance, because dis-
tance, ceteris paribus, ampliﬁes differences in occupational or
cultural knowledge and practices and because communica-
tion among actors becomes more problematic due to logis-
tical and time-related constraints. Analogous to the causal
mechanism developed for hypothesis 1, ﬁrms in CMEs for
which close coordination with creditors, employees and
other ﬁrms is important can be expected to offshore to
countries at a closer distance (or ‘nearshoring’ in short) to
limit coordination costs.
Moreover, for ﬁrms in Germany, on which we will focus
our empirical analysis in the next section, offshoring to the
near abroad, has been facilitated by the transformation of
its eastern neighbouring countries into capitalist democra-
cies in the 1990s. As elaborated in the previous section, a
model of ‘dependent market economies’ has emerged there,
allowing German ﬁrms to offshore parts of their production
with minimal coordination costs. It allowed them to easily
supervise subsidiaries and integrate them in their company
networks. The establishment of subsidiaries of German
banks in Central and Eastern Europe allowed German manu-
facturing ﬁrms to rely on their traditional ﬁnancing source.
Hence, offshoring to Central and Eastern Europe could allow
German ﬁrms to proﬁt from cost reductions while maintain-
ing advantages of non-market coordination.
Hypothesis 2: Firms in CMEs will engage in GVCs in
a way that is compatible with their comparative
institutional advantage by pursuing nearshoring
Empirical analysis of Germany
Our empirical focus is on Germany as the prototypical CME.
But to be able to put the analysis of Germany in perspec-
tive, we will compare it with the United States and the Uni-
ted Kingdom as benchmarks. This implies that our
discussion will be primarily focused on Germany, and our
analysis of the US and the UK will be much shallower. In
terms of sectors, we concentrate on Germany’s core indus-
tries characterised by incremental innovation: cars and
machinery. It is here that we expect ﬁrms to be confronted
most starkly with the offshoring trade-off between proﬁting
from cost reductions and losing advantages from close,
non-market coordination.
Germany has been seen as a special case in the world
economy since the end of the Second World War. An
extensive literature has emerged about the German model
(see below). For some time, and since then repeatedly, its
sustainability in the era of intensiﬁed globalisation has been
questioned. (Streeck, 1997) published a seminal article about
Germany in 1997, arguing how its external competitiveness
as a high-wage country could be explained through its dis-
tinctive set of socioeconomic institutions. However, he pre-
dicted that the German model would run into problems due
to globalisation (as well as secular exhaustion and reuniﬁca-
tion). In the meantime, evaluations of the German economy
have become more upbeat. While it was depicted as the
‘sick man of Europe’ in 1999 (The Economist 1999), 10 years
later Germany was labelled ‘Powerhouse Deutschland’ by
the same magazine (The Economist 2010). Germany’s fate
has impressed in this period of not only the ﬁnancial-eco-
nomic and euro crisis, but also the rise of GVCs and dein-
dustrialisation in developed countries as well. We will
analyse, along the hypotheses put forward in the previous
section, if there is anything peculiar in how German ﬁrms
have engaged in GVCs that can help explain this puzzle.
It is well known that Germany stands out for the contin-
ued importance of manufacturing in its economy. As can be
seen in Figure 1, the share of manufacturing value added in
the total GDP of Germany has remained constant in the per-
iod 1997–2015. It stands signiﬁcantly above the OECD aver-
age, more than 10 percentage points (p.p.) above the ﬁgure
for the US, and more than 12 p.p. above the share in the
UK. Germany remains particularly strong in exports of mid-
technology (MT) products (machinery, transport equipment
and process industries). In Germany, MT products remained
responsible for almost half of total goods exports between
1990 and 2011 (Foders and Vogelsang, 2014). That is signiﬁ-
cantly above the share of MT products in the total goods
exports in the US (about one-third) and still far above the
level in China, although it is on the rise there (a quarter in
2011). Germany has, on the other hand, one of the lowest
shares of high technology (HT) exports. These were higher
in LMEs such as the United States and grew spectacularly in
emerging economies such as China.
The continued success of German industry, particularly in
mid-technology products, is in line with arguments from the
VoC literature. Apparently, the intensiﬁcation of globalisation
and the rise of GVCs have not undermined Germany’s eco-
nomic performance in these sectors. Can this be explained
by our Hypothesis 1, namely that German ﬁrms have, con-
strained by their domestic institutions, offshored a smaller
share of their industrial activities than ﬁrms in the UK and
the US? If we look at an aggregate measure of trade in
value added (see Figure 2), namely the foreign value added
share of gross exports, the answer is no. We ﬁnd that Ger-
many is actually relatively highly integrated into interna-
tional value chains. The foreign content of Germany’s
exports was 25.5 per cent in 2011 (the latest year for which
trade in value added data are available), an increase of 10.6
percentage points since 1995. It is slightly above the share
for the UK and more than 10 p.p. above the one of the US.
Based on this aggregate measure, we could falsify our
ﬁrst hypothesis. But we need to qualify this ﬁnding. It has to
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be taken into account – as is the case with other trade
statistics – that the share of foreign value added is inversely
related to the size of one’s economy. Logically, the more
‘abroad’ there is for a country, ceteris paribus, the more for-
eign value added will be included in its exports. This helps
explain the difference between Germany and the US. This
bias can be overcome by comparing regional and extra-
regional rather than domestic and foreign value added.
Moreover, disaggregating the source of inputs in a country’s
exports beyond the ‘domestic-foreign’ dichotomy highlights
the geographical way in which ﬁrms offshore, necessary to
test our hypothesis 2. When we compare the origin of value
added in country’s exports on the basis of regional circum-
scriptions of similar size, we see that the ﬁgures for Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United States for 2011
are in fact almost identical (see Table 1).1 All three countries
source their intermediate inputs embodied in gross exports
of the total economy to a very large extent regionally (see
bold values in Tables 1-3).2
But these data still result in a partly misleading compari-
son. Not only the size of one’s domestic economy, but also
the sectoral composition of a country’s exports affects the
share of foreign value added in its total exports. Sectors dif-
fer on average in terms of the importance of foreign value
added, with some (mostly manufacturing) sectors on aver-
age being characterised by higher foreign value added than
other (mostly services) sectors. In other words, a country
Figure 1. Share of manufacturing in total value added (% of GDP)
Source: World Bank
Figure 2. Foreign value added as a share of total value added in gross exports
Source: OECD, Trade in Value Added Database
Table 1. Origin of value added in total gross exports (2011)
DEU US UK
NAFTA 2.51% 88.49% 3.31%
Europe 89.91% 3.71% 89.99%
East and South East Asia 3.28% 3.88% 3.12%
South and Central America 0.59% 0.74% 0.34%
Other 3.71% 3.18% 3.24%
Source: OECD, Trade in Value Added Database
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where industry is relatively more important than services
will have a higher foreign value added of its total exports
than a country where services are relatively more important.
The most important export sector in Germany (in domestic
value added terms) is motor vehicles (9.9%), followed by
machinery (8.4%), wholesale, retail and hotels (8.1%) and
chemicals (6.9%). Apart from wholesale, retail and hotels,
the other three top sectors are (industrial) sectors charac-
terised by relatively high shares of foreign value added
everywhere. In the UK, on the other hand, business services
generated the greatest source of domestic value added of
total exports at 13.9 per cent, followed by ﬁnance and insur-
ance (11.1%), wholesale, retail and hotels (9.3%) and chemi-
cals (6.2%). Apart from chemicals, the top sectors are
services sectors characterised by relatively low shares of for-
eign value added on average. The same applies for the US.
There, exports by the wholesale, retail and hotels industry
generated the greatest source of domestic value added in
2011 at 11.0 per cent, followed by business services (10.1%),
transport and telecoms (7.6%) and chemicals (7.1%). Again,
apart from chemicals, the top sectors are (services) sectors
characterised by relatively low shares of foreign value added
everywhere.
To control for not only the size of one’s economy but also
differences in export structures, we will concentrate in the
following tables on the two sectors in which Germany has a
comparative institutional advantage: transport equipment
and machinery. We ﬁnd in Tables 2 and 3 that in 2011 Ger-
many sources inputs as intermediates for gross exports in
transport equipment and machinery signiﬁcantly more
regionally than is the case for the US and the UK. East and
South East Asia are much less important in German value
chains of transport equipment and machinery than is the
case for the US and the UK.
In sum, German ﬁrms have not shied away from off-
shoring and integrating in ‘global’ value chains. But espe-
cially in the economy’s core sectors of transport equipment
and machinery, German ﬁrms have chosen more for ‘re-
gional’ sourcing than their counterparts in the US or the UK.
While our Hypothesis 1 can be refuted, supporting evidence
has been found for Hypothesis 2. Domestic institutions have
not precluded German ﬁrms from engaging in offshoring,
but have led them to choose more for regional value chains
than for true global value chains. This allows them to proﬁt
from cost reductions while maintaining comparative institu-
tional advantages to the maximum.
This article has mainly focused on the causal relationship
ﬂowing from domestic institutions to GVCs. To end this sec-
tion, I will, necessarily brieﬂy and mainly based on secondary
literature, reﬂect on the reverse relationship by discussing
the evolution of the German model in the era of GVCs. How
have German ﬁrms’ offshoring decisions discussed above
affected its domestic institutional conﬁguration?
The offshoring of value added tasks, mostly those requir-
ing lower skills, to its neighbouring countries, Central and
Eastern European countries in particular, has been seen as
part of a modiﬁcation of the political-economic model of
Germany. These changes have been extensively debated.
Some argue that they should be seen as of a systemic nat-
ure and as having ‘eroded’ the German model (e.g. Streeck,
2009). Others agree that signiﬁcant changes have occurred,
but qualify this more modestly as a ‘reconﬁguration’, charac-
terised by ‘dualisation’ and ‘decentralisation’ (e.g. Hassel,
2014; Kwon 2012; Palier and Thelen, 2010). Several authors
in the ﬁnal group argue that reorganising value chains
across the eastern border has been crucial in maintaining
industrial competitiveness and the viability of the German
model. This has allowed German ﬁrms to keep their compar-
ative advantage in incremental innovation and quality-differ-
entiated production while also keeping costs down (e.g.
Krzywdzinski, 2014). Rather than vetoing the internationalisa-
tion of production, German trade unions in core sectors
have supported nearshoring as an instrument to retain com-
petitiveness and employment. As Figure 3 shows, nearshor-
ing by German ﬁrms has indeed not replaced domestic
production and jobs but has rather expanded German capac-
ities to service increasing demand for (high-end) transport
equipment and for machinery products in emerging econo-
mies. Germany succeeded in keeping its employment in
machinery stable and in expanding it by almost 60 per cent
in motor vehicles. In the same period, employment
decreased in these sectors by between 20 and 45 per cent
in the US and the UK. While maintaining and even expand-
ing employment in Germany’s core sectors, offshoring lower
value-added task to neighbouring countries has led to a
change in the (skill) composition of domestic employment
and has increased cost competitive pressure on sourcing
ﬁrms of core ﬁrms at home. Our account should hence not
Table 2. Origin of value added in gross exports, transport
equipment (2011)
DEU US UK
NAFTA 2.89% 72.86% 4.85%
Europe 88.86% 8.75% 82.52%
East and South East Asia 4.01% 12.76% 7.04%
South and Central America 0.62% 1.27% 0.50%
Other 3.62% 4.36% 5.08%
Domestic 68.57% 64.59% 55.58%
Source: OECD, Trade in Value Added Database.
Table 3. Origin of value added in gross exports, machinery
(2011)
DEU US UK
NAFTA 2.39% 83.22% 4.83%
Europe 89.86% 5.34% 83.97%
East and South East Asia 4.14% 6.18% 6.31%
South and Central America 0.50% 1.33% 0.42%
Other 3.12% 3.93% 4.47%
Domestic 73.32% 77.61% 64.62%
Source: OECD, Trade in Value Added Database
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be read as an unqualiﬁed ‘success story’: maintaining indus-
trial employment in core sectors through strategic nearshor-
ing has not beneﬁted every section of German society
equally.
Conclusions
This article has integrated insights from two relatively recent
approaches that quickly came to dominate international
political economy and comparative political economy,
respectively GVCs and VoC. We have shown that they share
some roots and assumptions but also have some differ-
ences. Most importantly, we formulated two hypotheses that
result from integrating their insights. A ﬁrst is that ﬁrms in
coordinated market economies are expected to engage less
in offshoring because their comparative institutional advan-
tages offer fewer incentives and more constraints to do so.
A second is that ﬁrms in CMEs, when engaging in GVCs, will
prefer nearshoring as this allows them better to maintain
institutional advantages in an international context.
We have then engaged in an empirical analysis of Ger-
many, with data for the UK and the US as benchmarks. It
was found that Germany remains a peculiar country
among developed economies. To the envy of politicians in
other countries, the share of manufacturing in total output
and employment in Germany has remained at high levels.
Also when measured in value added statistics, the speciali-
sation structure of Germany remains distinctive when com-
pared with that of the US and the UK, with transport
equipment and machinery as the most important sectors.
Nevertheless, Germany’s institutional conﬁguration has not
precluded its ﬁrms from engaging in global value chain
integration. In aggregate terms, Germany is intensively
engaged in GVCs. We have nuanced this ﬁnding by
explaining it as partly the consequence of the relative size
of Germany’s domestic economy and of its specialisation
structure dominated by sectors where outsourcing is
prevalent worldwide. When looking at regional sourcing
strategies and at Germany’s two core sectors, where incre-
mental innovation is the main mode of product and pro-
cess development and coordination is supposed to be
essential, we found that German ﬁrms source their inputs
more regionally than is the case for the US and the UK, as
expected in our second hypothesis.
The German politico-institutional model has changed in
recent decades and years. There is a wide consensus that
these changes can be captured by the concept of ‘dualisa-
tion’ and that they are partly the result of intensiﬁed globali-
sation. Observers differ in their evaluation of these changes
as erosion or adaptation. In this article, we have shown that
integration in GVCs has not affected Germany’s high share
of manufacturing in total value added and employment or
the importance of its key sectors transport equipment and
machinery. Rather than decreasing German industrial
employment and value added, German ﬁrms in the core
sectors seem to have, in concert with trade unions, off-
shored parts of their production in a way that allowed them
to keep output and jobs at home by increasing their global
sales overall. GVCs, more regionally oriented than their
American and British counterparts, allowed them to main-
tain their advantages in quality-differentiated production
while also improving in cost-competitive terms. This has put
pressure on workers beyond ﬁrms in the core sectors, how-
ever.
Our ﬁndings are relevant for current societal as well as
academic debates (see Eckhardt and Poletti, 2018). In a
political climate where globalisation and offshoring are
often seen as indiscriminately having resulted in a loss of
manufacturing jobs in developed economies, we have
shown that this does not apply to Germany. As has been
described in other accounts, the integration of China and
Central and Eastern Europe in the global economy can
even be seen as a double positive shock for Germany (cf.
Dauth et al., 2014). While the former provided a huge
Figure 3. Employment in motor vehicles and machinery in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (1995 = 100)
Source: Eurostat and US Bureau of Labor Statistics
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export market for its key sectors, the latter allowed it to
build regional value chains that resulted in increased cost
competitiveness while maintaining its institutionally sup-
ported quality competitiveness. This shows, in line with the
key assumption of the VoC perspective, that globalisation
still allows for different choices about the structure of one’s
economy and workforce. For the Trump Administration in
the US, whose Director of Trade and Industrial Policy Peter
Navarro has declared to ‘envision a more German-style
economy, where 20 percent of our workforce is in manufac-
turing’ (Guo, 2017), a lesson of our analysis should be that
Germany has been able to maintain this high share of
employment in manufacturing partly through regional trade
integration, something the Trump Administration’s trade
policies go directly against. However, policy makers should
not be overly voluntaristic in copying the German success
story elsewhere. Germany’s industrial success is the product
of both a domestic institutional conﬁguration that has
developed over decades and more recently of the ability of
its ﬁrms to restructure their activities across the (eastern)
border to countries that provided a very convenient con-
text. Neither is readily available elsewhere.
Academically, we contribute to international and compar-
ative political economy by bringing key insights from both
disciplines into dialogue with each other. To the literature
on GVCs, we demonstrate how domestic institutions affect
ﬁrms’ responses to incentives ﬂowing from the rise of GVCs.
Firms in similar sectors in countries with similar factor
endowments can still face different incentives to offshore
production based on their different institutional environ-
ment. To the literature on VoC, we show how its arguments
can be adapted to the context of intensiﬁed globalisation
without losing relevance and explanatory power. In that
way, our analysis responds to a criticism on VoC that it has
a static bias and does not allow for (international economic)
change. Clearly, the case of Germany shows that a coordi-
nated market economy is able to dynamically adjust to a
changing international economic context while maintaining,
and capitalising on, its institutional advantages.
Our analysis naturally has its limitations as well. We have
concentrated on a single case study, while using data for
two other countries as benchmarks. Further research could
test our hypotheses for other countries and other sectors,
and in a more explicit comparative analysis. This would also
help to understand to what extent our ﬁndings are depen-
dent on the ‘unique’ circumstances of Germany, the proto-
typical coordinated market economy whose ﬁrms were
suddenly given the opportunity to offshore to receptive
neighbouring countries where they could largely maintain
their comparative institutional advantages.
Notes
This article has beneﬁted from feedback on various occasions. The
author would like to thank the editors of this Special Issue, Jappe Eck-
hardt and Arlo Poletti, for their outstanding guidance throughout the
process, participants at the Workshop ‘The Politics of Global Value
Chains: The Globalization of Production and the Challenge of
Governance’ at the 2017 ECPR Joint Sessions in Nottingham and at the
Workshop ‘New Perspectives on Global Value Chains and Global Produc-
tion Networks: Bringing Institutions Back’ in in York later that year for
their input, as well as two anonymous reviewers for Global Policy for
their excellent comments and suggestions.
1. While in the ﬁgures in the rest of this empirical section, we pre-
sent time series that allow to compare evolutions over time
between Germany, the UK and the US, in the next three tables
we only present data for the ﬁnal year for which data are avail-
able (2011). The reason for this is mainly pragmatic. Including in
one table or graph data for three exporting countries and ﬁve or
six source regions in a times series would make the table or
graph very convoluted. Moreover, substantially, we are especially
interested in where ﬁrms source their inputs in the most recent
year for which data are available, after the rise of GVCs. That, for
example, the importance of Europe in sourcing of inputs for Ger-
man car manufacturers has increased steadily over the 2000–2011
period is less signiﬁcant.
2. Domestic value added for Germany and the United Kingdom is part
of the region ‘Europe’. Domestic value added for the United States is
part of the region NAFTA.
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